Problem
Historical Context
Tenure and Estates
Restraints on Alienation
Indigenous Land Rights and Treaty
Expropriation
Brainstorm
Historical Perspective
Legal analysis
What legal issues can you “spot” in this problem? How would you describe those issues in your own words?
“…should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds”
“…strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies where, We have thought proper to allow Settlement: but that, if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose”
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What, if anything, does the Royal Proclamation say or imply about the source of Indigenous land rights recognized by the British Crown?
Treaty of Paris and the Royal Proclamation (1763)
Robinson Treaties (1850); numbered treaties (1871 - 1921)
Confederation (1867)

Indigenous land rights from an Anglo-Canadian legal perspective underwent a transformation over this period (1763 - 1867) along with the rise of settler colonialism, from “title” to limited “rights of use”.

Two key ideas:
All land “owned” by the king (radical or allodial title)
Privilege of tenure: property held “of the king”
Ownership of a legal interest in land, not ownership of land (e.g. fee simple estate).
2 The Governor in Council may direct the Attorney General to take proceedings to revest in the Crown
(a) any lands comprised in any grant, or any part thereof, which have become forfeited to the Crown for non-fulfilment of the condition in the grant;
(b) any or all lands of persons dying intestate and leaving no heirs or persons entitled to the said lands under the laws of the Province.
Grant/Grantor/Grantee
Devise/Testator/Donee
“Largest estate known to the common law”
“To A and her heirs.”

X grants: “To A and her heirs”
X grants: “To A”
X grants: “To A in fee simple”
Traditionally, only the first of these examples was interpreted by courts as granting an estate in fee simple to A, but this position has changed under modern provincial statutes. Why?
13 Except where a contrary intention appears by the conveyance,
(a) where words of limitation are not used, the conveyance conveys the whole property right that the party conveying had power to dispose of by the conveyance, including, in the case of real property, the fee simple;
X grants: “To A for life”
X grants: “To A for life, then to B”
X grants: “To A for life, then to B for life, then to C”
X grants: “To A in fee simple, then to B.”
“I give and devise unto my said wife all my real and personal property saving and excepting thereout as follows … and also should any portion of my estate still remain in the hands of my said wife at the time of decease undisposed of by her such remainder shall be divided follows …"
“Where there is absolute ownership, that ownership confers upon the owner the rights of an owner and restrains an alienation; and similar attempts to mould and control the law are void”
“When a testator gives property to one, intending him to have all the rights incident to ownership, and adds to this a gift over of that which remains in specie at his death or at the death of that person, he is endeavouring to do that which is impossible. His intention is plain but it cannot be given effect to.”
Fee simple (👍 claiming under Ellen Walker’s will)
Life estate + gift over (👍 claiming under John Walker’s will)
Is there a third option?
Construction of the will = intention of the testator
“The Court has then to endeavour to give such effect to the wishes of the testator as is legally possible, by ascertaining which part of the testamentary intention predominates and by giving effect to it, rejecting the subordinate intention as being repugnant to the dominant intention.”
What interest in land does Mr. Kiansky hold? Why does the court say that this interest counts as “ownership” of land?
To A for life, then to K and their heirs
To A for life, then to B when they turn 25 years of age.
To A and their heirs, until A turns 25 years of age, then to B.
“I will that the aforesaid parcels of land shall not be at their disposal at any time until the end of twenty-five years from the date of my decease, and farther, I will that the said parcels of land shall remain free from all incumbrance, and that no debts contracted by my sons, William Chisholm and Hugh Chisholm, shall by any means incumber the same during twenty-five years from the date of my decease.”
In what way is the restraint on alienation at issue in Blackburn different than the restraint at issue in Re Walker?
“[To MTI,] which non-profit organization should be prohibited from transferring the land to any other party for a period of 50 years, after which said organization may only transfer it to another Mi’kmaq-led entity for no more than an amount of $500,000.”
Disputes over property became the crucible in which a new, post-Confederation Canadian state forged core elements of its national character:
Relations with Indigenous peoples as a settler colonial state (St. Catherine’s Milling)
Economic foundations as a liberal market society driven by natural resource extraction (McLaren v Caldwell)
Below is a graphic representation of the legal positions of Ontario and Canada.

How do the courts in St. Catherine’s Milling answer these questions:
What is the source of Indigenous rights in land?
What is the content of these rights?
How did the Privy Council in St. Catherine’s Milling reach such a “thin” view of Indigenous land rights and title? What biases, assumptions, and legal principles allowed them to conclude that Indigenous interests were at most “personal and usufructory” rights?
“Territory without a master”: the 19th century justification for the Crown’s claims to sovereignty and title.
Terra nullius underpinned the doctrine of discovery: if Indigenous peoples’ lands were “legally vacant”, these lands could be “discovered” by the British and the assertion of sovereignty and title could be made without conquest or cession. This view requires a “discriminatory denigration” of Indigenous peoples, laws and other forms of social organization and practices.
Discovery was never “perfected” in British North America, where its application came to be understood as the Crown’s acquisition of a pre-emptive right to acquire Indigenous title/ownership (Johnson v McIntosh; RP1763)–thereby underscoring the contradiction of viewing Indigenous lands as “legally vacant”.
In St. Catherine’s Milling, the assumptions underlying terra nullius were extended further to deny that Indigenous nations held any true title to their lands at “discovery”; nevertheless the Crown’s pre-emptive right could be exercised to remove the “burden” of Indigenous rights in land through cession or purchase.
How does Locke’s theory of possession become a justification for terra nullius in the era of settler colonialism? Where can you find evidence of this?
How do the principles and assumptions from the St. Catherine’s Milling case drive Justice Patterson’s refusal to recognize Mi’kmaw treaty rights in Syliboy?
“Do you think a bequest of this nature (in our hypothetical problem) addresses the harms of settler colonialism advanced by the St. Catherine’s Milling decision and its aftermath?”
In what ways did British practices of land grants to Black settlers (Loyalists, Maroons and refugees) reflect emerging legal characterizations of Indigenous title at the time? Are there parallels or alliances between contemporary calls for land justice for African Nova Scotian communities and for Indigenous peoples? What differences are important to recognize here?
Room name: BAXTERDAL
Non-navigable: riparian owner owns the riverbed (and therefore the right to use the watercourse) to the centre-line of the river: ad medium filum aquae
Navigable: if river is navigable in fact, then there is a public right to navigation; title to the beds of these rivers is vested in the Crown
1847/52 - Ontario passes legislation re rivers and streams
1863 - Boale v Dickson: gives Ontario legislation restrictive interpretation
1880 - Chancery Court upholds Boale and grants McLaren an injunction
1881 - Ontario Court of Appeal overturns Boale
1882 - Supreme Court of Canada reinstates Boale and restores Mclaren’s injunction
1884 - JCPC overturns SCC decision (but on federalism grounds)
After Chancery decision, Ontario Legislature (Liberal) enacts Rivers and Stream Act (1881).
Federal Parliament (Conservative) disallows Rivers and Streams Act several times
How does the Ontario Court of Appeal interpret the provincial legislation at issue in McLaren v Caldwell?
What principle of statutory interpretation does Ritchie C.J., writing for the Supreme Court, use? What is the rationale offered for this principle?
Why, according to the federal Conservatives, should Ontario be required to pay compensation for “taking” McLaren’s property by enacting the Rivers and Steams Act (1881)? On what legal basis?
3(1)(c) “expropriate” means the taking of land without the consent of the owner by an expropriating authority in the exercise of its statutory powers;
[…]
24 Where land is expropriated, the statutory authority shall pay the owner compensation as is determined in accordance with this Act.
“It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner.”
(per Lord Macnaghten)
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon: is U.S. state regulation that prevents coal mining when it would cause subsidence an “uncompensated taking”?
As Canada pursues an economic program of resource extraction, legal rules about possession of wild animals become a key component of nation-building and national policy
Goals to promote fisheries and the development of other “open access resources” start to clash with worries about over-use of resources and the public means to regulate these activities
How would you use Clift v Kane and The Frederick Gerring Jr. to revisit and revise your answer to our Unit 1 problem (Wowkwis)?
Does the “rule of capture” in these cases follow the decision in Pierson v Post? If not, how are they different?